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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GENERAL INSURANCE CO!\-IPANY
OF AMERICA, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 7459

vs.
CHRISTIANSEN FURNITURE COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appella;:t.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
Respondent, the General Insurance Company of America,
hereinafter referred to as "Insurance Company," sued· Appellant; the Christiansen Furniture Company, a Utah Corporation,
hereinafter referred to as "Furniture Company," for rent which
accrued during the two months period imme4iately following
a fire on May 2, 1946, which partially damaged the property
it was occupying as tenant.
The respondent cannot agree with the statement of facts
contained in appellant's brief insofar as the same states that
3
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after the fire occurred, the owner of the premises requested
the Furniture Company to hold everything in the premises so
as to help in protecting the property until fire adjustment
insurance claims could be handled; nor that the building was
destroyed by the fire; nor that the appellant vacated the
.premises and only· instructed the Furniture Company to keep
a watch at night, and that there was an agreement that there
would be. no rent during the period in question.
.
The· Furniture Company ·occupied the premises at 66
South· Main Street in Salt Lake City, under an oral month-tomonth agreement prior to the fire, which occurred in the early
morning hours on lvlay 2, 1946 (Tr. 42, 43 and 44). The
building was owned by the Rental Investment Company, a
Utah Co_rporation, and rental. paid by the Furniture Company
was $875.00 per month (Tr. 43, 65, 66, 73, 75, 76 and 82Ph:tint-iff' s _Exhibit A) .
The· Rental Investment Company and the Furniture Company were separate Corporations but were kindred in nature
as the officers oL both companies were virtually the same.
Howard A. Christiansen was President of both cqrporations,
. Mabel C.-Larsen was Secretary-Treasurer of both companies,
while Ralph H. Christiansen was Vice President of the Rental
Investment Company and Golden M. Christiansen was Vice
_President of .the Furniture Company. _Thus t_he control of the
.two corporations was in the Christiansen family (Tr. 43, 53
and 74).
The premises ·were not rendered wholly unfit for occu. -pancy as is claimed by the Furniture Company. ·.The actual
4
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fire was confined to the area of the store where the business
office had been previously situated, and there was not very
extensive damage to the interior, except for smoke (Tr. 61,
62, 70 and 98, Plaintiff's Exhibits D, F, G, J and I).
The Furniture Company continued to occupy the premises
during the months of May and June. The office was maintained
therein and customers were invited in to make payments on
accounts and contracts (Tr. 66, 68, 80, 8l, 89, 96 and 97Plaintiff's Exhibits D and E). A two-day fire sale was conducted on June 24 and 25, some seven weeks after -the fir~
(Tr. 44, 69, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91 and 93-Plaintiff's Exhibits B and K). The Furniture_ Company finally__ va(:~ted
the premises on July 2nd or 3rd (Tr. ?9).
The Insurance Company paid the Rental Investme~! CotJ:lpany for the loss of rent sustained, as a result of the fire clamage
to the building, under the provisions of an "insurance policy
which insured the rental income from the premises_ r~ulting
from fire (Plaintiff's Exhibits A and C) .
Had the Furniture Company promptly vacated the premises
directly following the fire, repairs could have been completed
within sixty to seventy days (Tr. 75 and 76). The Insurance
Company was only obligated to pay for- the time it would
require to repair the building (Tr. 78). However, the- Furniture Cotnpa~y did nothing to facilitate ·vacating the-_ premises
---(Tr. 74).
At the time of settlement, the Insurance Company tt'ok
-a subrogation agreement from the Rental Investrilent Company
-(Tr; 74~Plaintiff's Exhibit A). )
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The Insurance Company then brought suit under this
subrogation agreement for the rent covering the ·months of
May and June, during which time the Furniture Company was
in possession of, and using the premises.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Trial Court propedy denied Defendant's motion
for non-suit and dismissal at the conclusion of Plaintiffs
evidence.

4. The Trial Court did not err in its findings that the
rental was $875.00 per month and in awarding Plaintiff judgment against the Defendant for two months rent plus interest.

3. The findings of fact of the Trial Court upon conflicting
evidence should riot be disturbed on review.

ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT:S MOTIONFOR NON-SUIT AND DISMISSAL AT
THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S EViDENCE.
In support of the motion for non~suit, the· appellant con. terids "that there was· an agreement that there should ·be rio
rent paid by the Furniture Company to the landlord, The Rental
Investment Company, . for · the two months' occupany of the
premises follriwing the ~fire. Howard -Chiistiarisen, President
6
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and Manager of the Furniture Company, testified that the
Rental Investment Company as landlord requested the Furniture Company to continue occupancy of the premises after the
fire as "a watchdog" and that it was not considered as a tenant.
1-.luch confusion can be avoided in this case if it will be
kept in mind that Howard Christiansen was President of both
the Rental Investment Company, the landlord, and the appellant Furniture Company, the tenant. Hence any agreements
alleged to have been consummated after the fire regarding the
matter of rent to be paid would be merely a state of mmd
existing within the person of Howard Christiansen, an agreement conveniently made with himself. Had this been the
usual landlord-tenant situation, where the two corporate entities were unrelated insofar as their officers were ·concerned,
the tenant would have been o~liged to immediately vacate
the premises or in lieu thereof, stand liable for the rent. The
contents of the building in the form of furniture stock would
not have been the concern of the landlord had not the President
been one and the same for both Corporations.
Counsel for the appellant details at length the testimony
of Howard Christiansen in support of his contention of nonsuit. However, the testimony of the most important witness,
Scott Wetzel, Jr., has been entirely ignored._ He testifted that
he was an independent insurance adjuster employed by ·the
Insurance Company to i_nvestigate . the f;ire _ and .-handle the
adjustment of the rental loss~ with the Rental Investment
Company_ (Tr. 60 and- ~1 ). His_ investig~tion-b.egan th~- qay
of the fire -(Tf. 61) _-and c9ntinued t~roughout- the two-month
: pe#od ~9£ -:oqcup~ncy o~ .the_ prem_i~es :bY the- ~~rni~re -C~m7
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pany, and for several months- thereafter until settlement· was
finally concluded (Tr. 74). Witness Wetzel had photographs
taken (Plaintiffs Exhibits D through I) on May 29th when
it became apparent that Howard Christensen was intentionally
delaying in an effort to effect a more favorable settlement with
the other _insurance carriers on the damages to the- building.
An entire alteration of the store from the original architectural
: design was contemplated and vacating by the Furniture Company was accordingly delayed (Tr. 64). During this course
of events the Furniture Company continued to occupy the
premises, conducted a fire sale on June 24th and 25th, and
not until July 2nd or 3rd were the premises finally vacated.
The evidence is uncontradicted in this respect and the photographs (Plaintiff's Exhibits D to I) conclusively show that
the damage to the building was not extensive and that most of
the furniture was undamaged except for smoke (Tr. 66 ancl
67;
.The ag!eed rental of the premises was $875.60 per month
(Tr. 65 and 66-Plaintiff's Exhibit A).- The Furniture Company retained possession for its exclusive use and benefit during the two-month period following the fire and accordingly
incurred liability for the rent. The Insurance Company desired to settle the claim for loss of rental with the Rental
Investment Company upon a fair basis but when the Furniture
-Company}nten!io~ally delayed vacating the'premises for over
two months after the fire, it insisted upon an -agreement of
__s:ubi9gati9ti- perm~tt!ng-"it _to seek restitution for the period

-~ o{ time-the_ F-urniture-C:ompany occupied_ the building as a
:- tenant. (Tt. 65f - The- subrogation agreement contained a
-

8
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covenant whereby the Rental Investment Company warranted
that it had not released or discharged the Furniture Company
from any claim it may have had for rent during the occupancy
of the premises following the fire (Plaintiff's Exhibit A).
The Court's attention is invited toa portion of the testimony of witness Wetzel (Tr. 73 and 74) which aptly explains
the difficulties in concluding settlement in view of the collusion existing between the Furniture Compa-ny as tenant,· and
the Rental Investment Company, as landlord:
By Mr. Skeen. "You know of no agreement of any
kind with respect to rental as between the Rental Investment and the Christiansen Furniture Company after
the date of the fire on May 2 ?A. I know of no agreement.
Q. And in your testimony here and in the claim that
is made you were simply assuming that· the same
rental would carry on after the fire as before the
fire?
A. Well, as you should remember, there was cohtentention by me that the loss of rental· to the RPntal
Investment Company was a difficult ·thing for, me
to determine, for the reason _that as l. dealt .with
you, y~u were the attorney· for the _R.ental trivestment
as against the attorney for the Christiansen Furniture Company, for whom you were ·also the attorney; so I was actually dealing with .two _merged
corporations who were actually one :and the_ ~arne
. _ .~the. sarne officers, practically _every or1e:
··
'

.

.

~-

~

..

.,

.

It was hard for. me to determine wh~f th,~ o\Jliga-tion was to the tenant arrd back "to the landlord.
-_ I C:ontend·ed {roill
b~giririing that aftet:the -in.- v.entor:ie·~ had :b~_en. completed an:d th~ -inSIJ.ff!~Ce

the
9
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companies had ·all agr~ed with. the- Christiansen
Furniture Company as to the extent of the damage,
the insurance company which had the Rental Investment was prejudiced by the • fact that the
Christiansen Furniture Company remained in the
premises and did nothing else to facilitate the date
that they _could return to the premises.

Q. That was the basis of the controversy between the
Christiansen Furniture Company and the insurance
company which finally resulted in the $4,000 settlement?
A. The $4,000 settlement was made on demand from
you, and any excess of that amount of money, the
agreement· was to reduce it in round figures, and
I passed it on to my principals, and they authorized
me to settle with this subrogation agreement.
The Trial Court had all of the evidence before it at the
conclusion of the plaintiff's case. It was the trier of the facts
and had opportunity to observe the demeanor of the various
w~tnesses. The Cop.rt concluded that the plaintiff had sustained
its burden of proof in showing a legal obligation on the part
of the Furniture Company to pay rent for the two-month period
follo~ing the fire and I respectfully submit that the defendant's
motion -for non-suit ·and dismissal was properly denied.

-II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS THAT THE RENTAL· WAS $875.00 PER MONTH
AND IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT
.AGAINST THE DEFENDANT . FOR TWO MONTHS
RENt PLUS tNTEREST.
1_0
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The only question of law really involved in the instant case
is whether the Furniture Company is liable for the full amount
of rent as a result of having retained possession of the premises
for a two-month period after the saine were partially damaged
by the fire. The evidence amply shows that the Furniture
Company did make substantial use of the premises and that
the same were not vacated until July 2nd or 3rd, two full
months after the fire.
The law is clearly stated in 32 American Jurisprudence,
Section 493, page 402:
"According to the common law as declared by the
English courts and by a rna jority <?f .the American
courts, a tenant remains liable for. the agreed rent of
the demised premises so long· as any_ part there()£ remains in existence capable of being· occupied or enjoyed
by him, irrespective of in jury or destruction by· fire
or other casualty. Thus, in the -absence ofa provision
in the lease, or of a statue, to the contrary,. the destn1:c:~
tion of buildings upon the leased· premises during the
term by fire, inevitable accident, the violence of nature,
or a public enemy, not so complete as to leave no part of
the subject matter of the lease in existence, does not
relieve the tenant from the obligation of his covenant
to pay rent; or entitle him to an abatement of a proportional part of the rent."
36 C.J., Section 1130, page 325.
52 .C.

J.

S., Section 486, page 255.

This is- clearly the majority rule -and is followed
recent case -of:
-Anderson·
P. 2d 302.

vs.

in the

Ferguson _(~~sbj!lgton~1~4~) _l3_5
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wherein the Court adjudged the tenant liable for the payment
of rent where a portion of the premises were destroyed by fire.
Another case quite in point is Knoblaugh et al vs. McKinney et al, Cal. 1935, 42 P. 2d 332.
In this case an earthquake rendered ·the plaintiff's apartment building uninhabitable for the most part, but the defendant, as a tenant, elected to remain in possession while the
plaintiff made repairs. The Trial Court held that the defendant
was liable for the full amount of the rent which was not affected
by the impairment of the property. by the earthquake.
Likewise in the case of White vs. Steele (Texas, 1930)
33 S.W. 2d 224, the Court held the tenant liable for rent during
the period of occupancy following a fire which partially destroy. ed th~ premises. In that case the defendant was renting a
store room in _a hotel _building when the building was about
50 per cent destroyed by fire: The defendant continued to use
a part of the space and thereby became liable for the full
amount of· the rent.
Gamble~Robinson Company vs. Buzzard et al. 65 Fed.
2d 950.
Demund vs. Oro Consolidated Mines (Arizona) 108
P. 2d 770.
Nick Pedro vs. D. A. Potter et al, 242 P.926,
. 42 A. L. R. 1165.

in the ca~e-ofSchatbauer vs. Cobean et al (N. M. 1938)
· 80 Pac. 2d 7S5, llS A. L. R. 1_02, the tenant occupied a store
·· buildirtg when the-· san?e ·was partially· damaged by ·fire: - The
-l:o~rt held :·the _-teriafit -liable,- foflowmg the: -~ajority -r~le as
:·ato~emeD.ddned. :

12
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The rule is also stated in Underhill, Landlord and Tenant,
Vol. II, paragraph 788, page 1339, wherein the author says:
"The relation of landlord and tenant is not ·determined by the destruction of the premises either where
the lease is _for a term of years in writing or from year
to year. · It is a well settled· rule of the common law
that where lands are the subject of a demise and the
buildings and improvements thereon are accidentally
destroyed before the end of the term, this destruction
of the buildings by fire, tempest or flood does not discharge the covenant to -pay rent in the absence of an
express stipulation to that effect."
See also Tiffany-Real Property, Third Edition,
Volume 3, para. 905, page 567.
Applying the foregoing rule of law to the instant· case,
the trial court properly found that the Furniture Company w~s
liable for rent for the two months in question and entered
judgment accordingly.
I fail to see where the two. cases cited in_ appellant's brief
are applicable to the instant situation. Thes~ cases bo~h
involved bankruptcy matters wherein a receiver was appoint~d _
to 1iquidate the assets of the businesses. The premises were
occupied for storage purpos~s in connection with preserving
the property of each receivership. . There was no claim that
the relationship of landlord and tenant eXisted and· accordingly
under the changed conditions the receiver in each ins~ance was
liable only for fair and reasonable rental based 'upon the
limited use of the premises. The respondent :has no argum~nt
with the conclusion reached by the Court in the two aforementioned cases for the reason that in each of_ them_ -a: r~~e!y_~r
'13
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had replaced the tenant and hence the landlord-tenant relationship was terminated. However; the cases have no application
to the instant situation.

I respectfully submit that the Trial Court did not ~~r
in- its ·Findings and--that the judgment as ·entered should be
affirmed.

III
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIA:L COURT
UPON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE
DISTURBED ON REVIEW.

law action, and the Court made its findings
of facf oasea· on· evidence upon which there was little conflict,
This---was~

a

except f.or tl1e biased testimony of witness Howard A. Christiansen~

In such a case, the authorities are in accord to the effect
that, in a law_ case, findings of a Trial Court will not be disturbed, unless ·~i~·~iiy· ·against the weight of the evidence.
·:..,_-...:.....·-.:.. -- .. -- _)2 :c;_ j:· s:, Para: 566, page 407:
~--

'

;.__

;.:

~'·}~-~-"~1,1~-f~.~~~~)q~.'!e~t, questi?ns. of law are for the
determination· of fne·-court, while 1ssues of fact are to
be determined by. the jury or by the trial court sitting
without a jury."
. 3 Am. Jur. 470:
·'The weight of conflicting evidence in an action tried
by the court without a jury is exclusively for the trial
court; and the appellate court must accept as true that

t4
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which tends to sustain the decision, and reject any
testimony in conflict with it."
The foregoing rule has been recently confirmed, by this
Court.
See Waverly Oil Works Co. vs. R. B. Epperson, Inc.,
105 Utah 553, 144 P. 2d 286.

As has been heretofore discussed at length under Points
I and II, the trial court had substantial evidence to prove the
questions of duration of the tenancy by the Furniture Company,
a~d the time of termination thereof. The findings were in
favor of the plaintiff on these issues and judgment accordingly
entered. From a preponderance of the ~vidence, the Court
properly drew its own conclusion as to the liability· of the
appellant Furniture Company for the payment of rent during
the two-month occupancy of the premises foJlowing the fire ..
ln conclusion, I respectfully submit that the judginerit

as rendered by the trial court is, in all respects, correcF'antl
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
F. ROBERT BAYLE,

Attorney for Plaintiff
and 'Respondent.
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